United Nations S/2004/17

Security Council

Distr.: General
13 January 2004

Original: English

Letter dated 30 December 2003 from the Chairman of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism addressed to the President of the Security Council

I write with reference to my letter of 9 October 2003 (S/2003/1010). The Counter-Terrorism Committee has received the attached fourth report from Japan submitted pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (2001) (see annex). I would be grateful if you could arrange for the present letter and its annex to be circulated as a document of the Security Council.

(*Signed*) Inocencio F. **Arias**
Chairman
Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1373 (2001) concerning counter-terrorism

04-20628 (E) 040204

Annex

Note verbale dated 26 December 2003 from the Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations addressed to the Chairman of the Counter-Terrorism Committee

The Permanent Representative of Japan to the United Nations presents his compliments to the Chairman of the Committee and, pursuant to paragraph 6 of resolution 1373 (2001) and in response to the latter's letter dated 3 October 2002, has the honour to transmit the fourth report of the Government of Japan on the steps it has taken to implement the resolution (see enclosure).

Enclosure*

JAPAN

FOURTH REPORT TO THE COUNTER-TERRORISM COMMITTEE PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 6 OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 1373 (2001) OF 28 SEPTEMBER, 2001

* Annexes are on file with the Secretariat and are available for consultation.

Fourth report(*) of Japan to the Counter-Terrorism Committee pursuant to paragraph 6 of Security Council resolution 1373 (2001) of 28 September

(Note: This report is a response to the comments/questions posed in the fourth letter of the CTC dated 3 October 2003.)

Sub-paragraph 1.1

Sub-paragraph 1(a) of the Resolution requires all States to suppress the financing of terrorism. The third report from Japan states (at page 6) that "financial institutions are also required by the Anti-Organised Crime Law to report to the Japanese Financial Intelligence Office (JAFIO) transactions that they suspect are related to financing of terrorism". Please provide information to the CTC indicating whether the JAFIO or another competent authority has jurisdiction to impose sanctions or penalties on parties who fail to comply with their reporting obligations. The CTC would appreciate receiving information on any criminal, civil or administrative sanctions which may be imposed for failure to comply with reporting obligations.

According to Article 54 of *the Law for Punishment of Organized Crimes, Control of Crime Proceeds and Other Matters (the Anti-Organised Crime Law)*, a financial institution or any other person provided for in a Cabinet Ordinance (hereinafter referred to as a "financial institution or the like") shall promptly report to the competent authorities in charge (including the JAFIO of the FSA) when it is deemed that there are suspicions that the property received by such financial institution or the like is the proceeds of crime. The competent authorities in charge (excluding the JAFIO) shall, upon receipt of the report, promptly notify the JAFIO of the matters regarding the report. In terms of sanctions, the supervisory organizations (such as the FSA) have jurisdiction to impose administrative sanctions (such as an administrative order) upon financial institutions or the like which fail to comply with their reporting obligations. At the FSA, the supervisory bureau rather than the JAFIO may impose the administrative sanctions. To date there are two cases in which the FSA has imposed administrative sanctions under Article 26 of the *Banking Law*.

Article 26. Suspension of Banking Business Activity

1. When deemed necessary to ensure the sound and appropriate management of banking business of a bank in light of the business or financial conditions of said bank or the business or financial conditions of said bank and the subsidiaries thereof, the Prime Minister may require said bank to submit a plan for improvement of business operations containing a statement of the measures said bank will implement and the timing for such, as necessary, to ensure the sound and appropriate management of banking business, may order said bank to modify any such plan for improvement of business operations, may order said bank to suspend all or part its business operations for a period of time, may order said bank to deposit assets to competent authorities or may order that other measures be implemented as deemed necessary for supervisory reasons.

Sub-paragraph 1.2

As regards the suppression of the financing of terrorism as required by sub-paragraph 1(a) of the Resolution, the CTC would appreciate receiving information on how JAFIO is structured and staffed (financially and technically) to perform its mandated functions? Please provide data concerning the requirements referred to immediately above.

The JAFIO is currently staffed with 18 persons, including the staff seconded from law enforcement authorities. A budget of 64 million and 955 thousand yen has been prepared as the required costs for JAFIO (excluding personnel costs).

Sub-paragraph 1.3

Sub-paragraph 1(c) of the Resolution requires States to freeze funds and other financial or economic resources related to terrorism. In this regards does Japan have a separate authority or agency responsible for seizing and confiscating terrorist related assets? The CTC would appreciate receiving an outline of the legal basis for such an authority or agency as well as an outline of its functions. The CTC would also welcome an account of the legal provisions allowing for review of the decisions taken by any such authority or agency. Please indicate the financial magnitude of the assets frozen.

As far as criminal procedures are concerned, the seizing and confiscating of terrorist related assets are generally subject to the same legal provisions as other crimes; The *Code of Criminal Procedure*, the *Penal Code*, the *Law for Punishment of Organized Crimes, Control of Crime Proceeds and Other Matters*, etc. The seizure of assets as evidence may be undertaken either by public prosecutors or by judicial police officials.

With regard to confiscation, in Japan, there are no provisions for confiscation other than following a criminal conviction. Since September 2001, when the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1373, there have been no assets seized or confiscated in a criminal procedure having to do with a terrorism-related offense. (NOTE: There has been no typical terrorism offense since the so-called "Sarin Subway Attacks" committed by the Aum Shinrikyo cult in 1995. For related information concerning assets frozen prior to September 2001, please refer to the sub-paragraph 1.5.) A person may make a request to a court for review of seizure or confiscation according to the provisions of the *Code of Criminal Procedure*.

Sub-paragraph 1.4

Sub-paragraph 1(d) of the Resolution requires States to have legal measures in place to regulate alternative money remittance service/transfer services and informal banking networks. The CTC would appreciate receiving the number of money remittance/transfer services registered and/or licensed in Japan? Can money remittance/transfer services engage in business in Japan without being registered or licensed?

The Japanese government permits money remittance services to be provided only by licensed financial institutions such as banks and by governmental financial institutions. Engaging in money remittance services without being licensed is subject to punishment under domestic laws such as the *Banking Law*. The total number of financial institutions which operate money remittance services is 2381 as of 31 March 2003.

Sub-paragraph 1.5

In its first report, Japan states (at page 5) that "the Government has so far frozen 4 accounts (with about $600,000) in Japan, and is examining other accounts". The CTC would appreciate receiving up to date information about other accounts which were frozen because of their suspected connection with the financing of terrorism.

The four frozen-accounts (with about US$600,000) in the first report were unfrozen in January 2002, as the UN Sanctions Committee delisted the entities concerned (Da Afghanistan Bank, Banke Millie Afghan, Agricultural Development Bank of Afghanistan and Export Promotion Bank of Afghanistan) from the list. No other accounts have been frozen since then.

Sub-paragraph 1.6

In order to effectively implement sub-paragraph 2(e), States are required to take measures to ensure that terrorists and their supporters are brought to justice. In this regard has Japan provided its administrative, investigative, prosecutorial and judicial authorities with specific training aimed at enforcing its laws in relation to:

- *Typologies and trends to counter terrorist financing methods and techniques?*
- *Techniques for tracing assets, which represent the proceeds of crime or which are to be used to finance terrorism, with a view to ensuring that such assets are frozen, seized or confiscated?*

The Ministry of Justice organizes conferences and training courses for prosecutors from all over Japan to share information about activities of criminal organisations, enhance investigative techniques against such crimes and effectively implement provisions for deprivation of funds such as illicit proceeds. Contents of conferences and courses are not limited to terrorist crimes but cover organized crime in general.

The National Police Agency has various training programs on investigation of financial crimes at the National Police Academy, Regional Police Schools and Prefectural Police Schools, based on the view that the training of police personnel is essential to detecting and preventing money laundering and financing of terrorism. In 2002, the National Police Academy strengthened its organization in order to enhance the quality of training for investigation of financial crimes, including investigation of financial institutions for a flow of concealed funds and investigation of financial conditions of companies.

Sub-paragraph 1.7

Sub-paragraph 2(e) of the Resolution requires each Member State, inter alia, to have in place effective police, intelligence and/or other structures as well as adequate legal provisions to detect, monitor and apprehend those involved in terrorist activities and those supporting terrorist activities with a view to ensuring that those persons are brought to justice. The CTC would be grateful for information concerning the use of special investigative techniques in the fight against terrorism, such as undercover police operations, controlled deliveries and the monitoring and/or the interception of terrorist communications (such as the internet, radio, audio-visual media and other advanced communications techniques).

1. Undercover Police Operations and/or Controlled Deliveries

Although there are no specific provisions which explicitly empower investigators to conduct undercover operations or controlled deliveries, such investigative techniques are deemed to be legitimate as long as they do not include coercive measures which constitute violations of human rights. As to undercover operations, the *Narcotics and Psychotropics Control Law*, *Opium Law and Firearms and Swords Control Law* specifically allow investigators to receive narcotics, opium and firearms under the permission of the competent authorities. As to controlled delivery, there is a closely related provision in the *Law Concerning Special Provisions for Narcotics and* the *Psychotropics Control Law, etc., and Other Matters for Prevention of Activities Encouraging Illicit Conduct and Other Activities Involving Controlled Substances through International Cooperation*, which stipulates that customs officers may permit the importation or exportation of illegal drugs under certain requirements.

2. Monitoring and/or Interception of Terrorist Communications

Article 222-2 of the *Code of Criminal Procedure* and the *Telecommunications Interception Law for Criminal Investigation* empower the police to conduct interception of communications among suspected perpetrators in certain serious organized crime activities such as murder and illegal transactions of firearms or drugs, with warrants issued by judges. Although these provisions may be utilized in investigations of terrorist organizations, the procedures followed must meet requirements such as the existence of sufficient grounds to

suspect commission of the specific criminal offences and grounds to suspect the involvement or complicity of more than one person.

Sub-paragraph 1.8

In order to effectively implement sub-paragraph 2(e) of the Resolution, States have to take measures to ensure that terrorists and their supporters are brought to justice. In this regard are there programs in place in Japan to protect members of the judiciary, law enforcement officers, witnesses and persons willing to provide information from intimidation by terrorists? If there were such programmes, the CTC would be grateful to receive information on that.

Under the *Penal Code*, obstructing or compelling performance of official duty is criminalized as follows:

Article 95. Obstructing or Compelling Performance of Official Duty

1. A person who uses violence or intimidation against a public officer engaged in the performance of his or her duties shall be punished with imprisonment at or without forced labour for not more than three years.

2. The same shall apply to a person who uses violence or intimidation against a public officer in order to cause him or her to perform or refrain from performing an official act or in order to bring about his or her resignation.

Under the *Code of Criminal Procedure*, witnesses and persons willing to provide information are protected (ANNEX 1). The *Penal Code* contains provisions criminalizing the act of intimidation, especially the intimidation of a witness (ANNEX 2).

Sub-paragraph 1.9

Effective implementation of paragraph 1 and 2 of the Resolution requires States to criminalize the financing of terrorism and ensuring that those who participate in terrorism are brought to justice. In this regard could Japan please provide the CTC with information relating to the number of persons prosecuted for?

- *terrorist activities;*
- *the financing of terrorist activities;*
- *providing support to terrorist or terrorist organizations.*

How many of these have been prosecuted for inviting support (including recruitment for):

- *proscribed organisations; and*
- *other terrorist groups or organisations.*

In Japan, since September 2001, when UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1373, there has been no criminal prosecution for the listed five (5) types of offense. (NOTE: There has been no typical terrorism offense since the "Sarin Subway Attacks" committed by the Aum Shinrikyo cult in 1995.)

Sub-paragraph 1.10

Effective implementation of legislation, covering all aspects of the implementation of the Resolution, requires States to have in place effective and coordinated executive machinery as well as to create and utilize adequate national and international counter-terrorist strategy. Could Japan outline how its special counter-terrorist strategy, policy and /or activity address the following areas;

- *Criminal investigation and prosecution;*
- *Counter-terrorist intelligence (human and technical);*
- *Links between terrorism and others criminal activities;*
- *Physical protection of potential terrorist targets;*
- *Emerging threats;*

1. Criminal Investigation and Prosecution

Conducting thorough criminal investigations of terrorist organizations and depriving them of their resources such as funds, weapons and members is the basic strategy to counter terrorist threats. Japanese law-enforcement agencies have conducted many investigations of terrorist incidents, including the Sarin Subway Attacks in Tokyo by Aum Shinrikyo. Although the incident could not be prevented, a series of simultaneous raids on the groups facilities and the swift apprehension of leading members served to identify and neutralize the group rather quickly.

Since the terrorist attack on 11 September 2001, Japanese law-enforcement agencies have been working exhaustively to fight against terrorist threats and exerting their utmost efforts in the areas of criminal investigation and prosecution as well as counter-terrorist intelligence and physical protection of potential targets.

2. Counter-terrorist Intelligence

Japanese law-enforcement agencies and other government organisations have a strong tradition of countering terrorist threats effectively by gathering and exchanging necessary intelligence in order to utilize the results in criminal investigation and protection of potential targets. These functions have been reinforced significantly over the past two years, especially in the area of interagency coordination and international cooperation. Nevertheless, further development in this area is another focal point of our endeavour, including considerations of necessary shifts in priorities and reforms of organizational structures of the agencies concerned.

3. Links between terrorism and others criminal activities

(1) Since it is our great concern that organisations or countries which support terrorist activities may acquire WMD (weapons of mass destruction) in order to carry out serious terrorist attacks, Japan is proactively working to regulate the illegal export of WMD related materials. For example, Japan is making efforts to reveal illegal cases through our intelligence and criminal investigation activities and to maintain close cooperative relationships with other countries.

(2) Japan is tightening border control and control of illegal residents in order to prevent terrorists from infiltrating into our country and committing terrorist acts in Japanese territory.

4. Physical protection of potential terrorist targets

Although good intelligence and thorough investigation are the primary tools for prevention of terrorist attacks, physical protection of potential terrorist targets is also an indispensable element in counter-terrorism strategy. The basic goals in this area are to deter terrorists from attempting attacks, to detect terrorists and physically prevent them from attacking, and to manage the consequences in order to avoid exacerbation of the damage. The Japanese government has been putting its utmost efforts since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 into attaining these aims, by protecting not only its own interests but also the interests of its allies. To date there have not been any major terrorist incidents in Japan. The Japanese government will continue to improve its capacity in this area by further reinforcing equipment, systems and contingency plans, as well as by promoting training and conducting exercises at the local, national and international levels.

At present, the Japanese government carries out measures for physical protection of such potential terrorist targets as are listed below; as well as the necessary physical protection measures for the interest of allies, namely embassies and consuls, etc., in Japan, according to the security situations.

(1) Nuclear power plants

- The police have positioned special units with tactical weapons around the clock at all nuclear power plants.
- The Japan Coast Guard has kept its armed patrol vessels positioned at all times in the vicinity of all nuclear power plants since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, and the special units are always ready to respond immediately to prevent terrorists from gaining access to nuclear plants.
- Based on the *Law for the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors*, an operator is obliged to set regulations for protection and to implement various measures, such as posting of security guards and control of access to a facility site.

(2) Prime Minister's Official Residence

The Prime Minister's official residence protective force of the Metropolitan Police Department is deployed. It is a specialized unit with equipment which can cope with attacks by firearms, explosives, etc. This force operates in close coordination with protective agents and with the riot squad that defends the perimeter.

(3) Facilities where a large number of people gather (such as a large-scale stadium)

The police give advice and instructions to the administrators of facilities where a large number of people gather about strengthening of security measures and carry out necessary security activities, depending on the situation.

(4) Subway, etc.

The police conduct the necessary security activities in cooperation with the subway administrators, such as reporting of the discovery of suspicious objects and installation of crime prevention cameras.

(5) Airport

In order to prevent passengers from taking dangerous items such as weapons on an aircraft and to identify suspicious characters, etc., the police deploy police officers in the security check areas of airports and reinforce the watch at the check-in counter, etc.

5. Emerging threats

It is our great concern that the threat of so-called "cyber-terrorism" is increasing. In Japan, "cyber-terrorism and similar activities" refers to electronic attacks against critical infrastructures that have potential critical effects on social and economic activities of the nation, using info-communications networks or information systems. In order to prevent the occurrence of cyber-terrorism and exacerbation of damage, investigate cyber-terrorism incidents and arrest the perpetrators, the Japanese government is actively taking counter-measures by strengthening counter-cyber-terrorism investigative activities and intelligence functions, as well as by cooperating more closely with managers of the critical infrastructures.

Sub-paragraph 1.11

Effective implementation of paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Resolution require States to take the necessary steps to prevent terrorist acts and sub-paragraph 2(g) seeks to prevent the movement of terrorists or terrorist groups by having effective customs and border controls to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist activities. Does Japan impose controls on the cross-border movement of liquid cash, negotiable instruments as well as precious stones and metals (for example, by imposing an obligation to make a declaration or to obtain prior authorisation before any such movement takes place)? Please provide information concerning any relevant monetary or financial thresholds.

Article 19 of the *Japanese Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law* obliges anyone who transports means of payment exceeding 1 million yen or its equivalent, or precious metal (gold of more than 90% purity

only) exceeding 1 kg. of total weight, to submit a report to customs. The means of payment includes Japanese or foreign currencies, cheques (including traveller's cheques), promissory notes and securities.

Sub-paragraph 1.12

Paragraph 2 of the Resolution also requires States to prevent the movement of terrorists and the establishment of safe havens. As regards international flights, does Japan compare the information contained in advanced passenger manifest programs with the information contained in counter-terrorist databases with a view to scanning inbound passengers before they land?

Japan is preparing to introduce the Advance Passenger Information System (APIS) in the fiscal year 2004. In the APIS, data on crews and passengers, which are provided before the arrival of international flights at Japanese airports, are compared with the blacklist, including information on terrorists.

Sub-paragraph 1.13

Sub-paragraph 2(g) requires States to have in place effective measures to control the issuance of identity papers and travel documents. Could Japan please outline the legal provisions and other procedures in place which govern the acquisition of Japanese citizenship and passport?

The *Nationality Law* governs the acquisition of Japanese nationality. In accordance with the law, for example, a child whose father or mother is a Japanese national at the time of his or her birth, or a child born in Japan both of whose parents are unknown, naturally acquires Japanese nationality at the time of birth. A child under 20 years of age, who has acquired the status of a legitimate child by reason of the marriage of his or her father and mother and their acknowledgement may acquire Japanese nationality by making notification to the Minister of Justice. This applies to a child whose father or mother was, at the time of the child's birth, a Japanese national and is presently a Japanese national. A person who is not a Japanese national may acquire Japanese nationality by obtaining naturalization permission from the Minister of Justice.

The outline of the legal provisions and other procedures which govern the acquisition of a Japanese passport is as follows:

1. *Passport Law*

The characteristics of the *Passport Law* are as follows:

(1) Application principle: A passport is issued upon application by a person. At the time of application, an applicant shall in principle appear in person. The applicant may send a proxy for application, but at the time of delivery the applicant must appear in person.

(2) "One Passport to One Person" principle: Prohibition against the holding of more than one passport.

(3) Each prefecture administrates passport issuance in Japan.

(4) Penal provisions: Punishment for fraudulent passports or illegal use of passports.

2. Structure related to passports within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs

The Passport Division, Consular and Migration Affairs Department, is in charge of passport administration. Only the Ministry issues diplomatic and official passports. In Japan, the legal authority to issue ordinary passports belongs to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, but prefectural passport offices are in charge of issuing such passports in cooperation with the Ministry, since prefectural governors are entrusted to assume this responsibility under the *Passport Law*.

3. Procedure for issuing ordinary passports

Application forms are to be filled out and signed by applicants. Upon receipt of application, a passport officer in charge collates the required documents attached to the application such as a certified copy of the family register or abstract copy thereof and a certified copy of the resident register, verifying that the applicant has not made any mistake in filling out the application, and, upon confirming the identity of the applicant, proceeds to screen the application. At the time of application, an applicant must present some form of identification.

All of the computer terminals in prefectural passport offices are on-line with the host computer (mainframe) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and all passport application data are to be examined in comparison with previous data, especially in order to avoid multiple issuance as well as to screen through the updated blacklist for those who have criminal or related records, by means of the host computer.

For applications within Japan, it generally takes one week for the domestic offices to issue passports. Machine readable passports (MRP) have been issued in Japan since November 1992 in accordance with guidelines introducing the use of MRP, which were adopted as a means of accelerating the clearance of increasing numbers of passengers at international airports by the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). This kind of passport is also issued at thirty-one overseas offices.

Sub-paragraph 1.14

Paragraph 3(g) of the Resolution requires States to have procedures in place to prevent the abuse of refugee status by terrorists. Japan states, in its first report (at page 13), that "the government of Japan does not in general reveal the details of refugee applicants in order to protect their lives and privacy". The CTC would appreciate knowing whether the locations of asylum seekers in Japan are monitored. If so, is this task undertaken by local police or by a national organisation?

All foreigners staying in Japan, regardless of whether they are refugee applicants or not, are obliged to apply for registration of their status with the local government within 90 days of their landing, in accordance with the *Alien Registration Law*. The Japanese immigration authority is able to verify the location and status of refugee applicants by taking appropriate measures through this alien registration system. Illegal residents, including refugee applicants, under the procedure for deportation, which is different from the procedure for recognition of refugee status, are in principle detained in one of the immigration facilities and kept under close observation by the immigration authorities.

Sub-paragraph 1.15

Sub-paragraph 2(a) of the Resolution requires each Member State, inter alia, to have in place appropriate mechanisms to control and prevent terrorist access to weapons. Japan indicated, in the first report (at page 10), that it has complied with international standards with a view to protecting and safeguarding hazardous materials, such as radiological, chemical, and biological substances and their waste products. Has Japan established a national reporting or auditing procedure to detect the loss or theft of the materials, referred to immediately above, from government or private sources?

(Radiological materials)

Concerning radiological materials, the loss or theft of radiological materials is to be reported to the police or the Japan Coast Guard without delay, in accordance with the *Law Concerning Prevention from Radiation Hazards due to Radioisotopes, etc.* and the *Law for the Regulations of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors.*

(Chemical substances)

Concerning chemical substances, the loss or theft of the Specified Chemicals (i.e., Schedule 1 chemicals as defined by the Chemical Weapons Convention) is to be reported to the police or the Japan Coast Guard without delay, in accordance with the *Law on the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and the Regulation of Specific Chemicals, etc*. At the same time, the law requires mutual cooperation between the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry and the National Public Safety Commission to prevent the loss or theft of such substances. The Specific Chemicals in the research facility of the Japan Defense Agency are strictly controlled by the Agency, in accordance with the *Order Regarding the Production of the Specific Chemicals* and other rules, in which the appropriate procedures for production and use of the chemicals are stipulated, thereby preventing their loss or theft. In addition, certain chemicals stipulated in the *Poisonous and Deleterious Substances Control Law* and the *Cabinet Order* for its implementation are subject to immediate reporting to the police in case of their theft or loss.

(Biological substances)

Voluntary reporting of the loss or theft of biological materials to the police is encouraged, as in the case of loss or theft of other commodities. After the 9.11 terrorist attack on the United States, competent ministries have been requesting those who possess biological agents to take appropriate biosecurity measures, including the reporting of the loss or theft of the agents to those ministries as well as to the police. In addition, the competent ministers may order those who deal with biological agents or toxins to make compulsory reports regarding their activities to the extent necessary for preventing the developing, producing, retaining and acquiring of such agents for purposes other than peaceful ones.

Sub-paragraph 1.16

Has Japan the necessary specialist procedures and personnel in place in order to provide the appropriate safety and law enforcement responses in the event of such materials being detected? In such an eventuality, would Japan be able or willing to assist another country or countries?

NBC special units have been established at eight Prefectural Police Headquarters in order to respond immediately in case of NBC terrorism for information gathering, detection and collection of agents and evacuation of victims, in cooperation with other relevant organizations. NBC equipment and machinery (for example, detectors, decontamination equipment and protective suits) are provided to all Prefectural Police Headquarters and 138 Fire Departments out of approximately 900 in the country are provided with the necessary equipment in order to counter chemical or biological disasters. The Japan Coast Guard also has special units to cope with terrorism. Depending on the situation, the Self-Defense Forces would support relevant organizations by dispatching their forces as disaster relief operations, etc. Any assistance to other countries will be seriously considered, depending on the circumstances.

Sub-paragraph 1.17

The CTC is aware that Japan may have covered some or all of the points in the preceding paragraphs in reports or questionnaires submitted to other organisations involved in monitoring international standards. The CTC would be content to receive a copy of any such report or questionnaire as part of Japan's response to these matters as well as details of any efforts to implement international best practices, codes and standards which are relevant to the implementation of the Resolution.

There is no such report or questionnaire.

Sub-paragraph 2.2

The CTC's Directory of Assistance (www.un.org/sc/ctc) is frequently updated to include new relevant information on available assistance. The CTC notes with appreciation that the Government of Japan has offered to provide assistance to other States in connection with the implementation of the Resolution and would appreciate receiving any updates to the information posted on the Directory of Assistance. Furthermore, the CTC would encourage Japan to inform the CTC of assistance it is currently providing to other States in connection with the implementation of the Resolution.

Japan has extended counter-terrorism capacity building assistance. Details of such assistance are as indicated in ANNEX 3.